Abstract Yao's theorem gives an equivalence between the indistinguishability of a pseudo-random generator and the unpredictability of the next bit from an asymptotic point of view. In this paper we present with detailed proofs, modified versions of Yao's theorem which can be of interest for the study of practical cryptographic primitives. In particular we consider non-asymptotic versions. We study the case of one pseudo-random generator, then the case of a family of pseudo-random generators with the same fixed length and finally we consider the asymptotic case. We compute in each case the cost of the reduction (in the sense of complexity theory) between the two algorithms.
Introduction
In [5] A. Yao defines the notion of indistinguishability for a family of pseudo-random generators depending on a security parameter. It is the impossibility in an asymptotic context to build a uniform (in the sense of uniform Turing machine) probabilistic polynomial time algorithm able to distinguish these pseudo-random generators from a corresponding family of truly random generators. Next, he defines the notion of polynomial statistical test and then defines for a source S and a statistical test M what the meaning of the following assertion is: "the source S passes the statistical test M". It turns out that this meaning is, roughly speaking, the unpredictability of the next bit knowing the first ones. He states the asymptotic equivalence by probabilistic polynomial reduction of the indistinguishability and the unpredictability of the next bit.
The study of provable security notions can be developed from different points of view:
(1) the study can be done in a static context, with given parameters. In this case, the sizes of the objects are fixed, implying no asymptotic study; (2) on the contrary the study can be done in a dynamic context, namely the system depends on a variable parameter (the so-called security parameter) growing to infinity. A classical example is the Blum Blum Shub pseudo-random generator family based on a modulus N of size k. In this case, all data depend on the security parameter k and the asymptotic study consists in passing k to infinity.
In the paper [5] , the study is done in an asymptotic context. Let us note that unfortunately, there exist few books on cryptography introducing Yao's theorem and, as far as we know, always in asymptotic formulation. Good reference works on this topic are the books [1] [2] [3] and [4] .
In this paper, we present modified versions of Yao's results, in particular a static version for any pseudo-random generator and for any finite family of pseudorandom generators. In each case, we give detailed proofs and we compute the exact cost of the reduction between the notion of indistinguishability and the notion of unpredictability of the next bit. We stress that this point of view can be of interest for a practical study of concrete pseudo-random generators with a fixed length. Finally we derive from the preceding results an asymptotic version which generalizes the classical Yao's theorem to a family of pseudo-random generators having the same security parameter k, as k tends to infinity. Section 1.1 sets the typographic conventions used in this paper and the main notations. Section 1.2 specifies the general assumptions made on the probabilistic algorithms and random draws. Section 2 contains background information on pseudorandom generators including notions of probability related to them. In Section 3 we introduce the security notions and in particular those of indistinguishability and unpredictability. Then we prove a static version of Yao's theorem and compute the cost of the reduction between the two notions aforementioned. In Section 4 we generalize the results of Section 3 to a family of pseudo-random generators with fixed parameters. In Section 5 we derive from Section 4 a detailed proof of a slight improvement of the asymptotic Yao's theorem stated in [1, 2, 5] and [4] .
Notations

Typography
In the sequel, letters k, l, i, s, n, m denote integers, A, B, · · · denote algorithms and vectors in {0, 1} m are denoted by X, Y, Z , · · · . For example X = (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x l ) denotes a finite bit sequence (x i ) i . The bits will be denoted by x i , y i , b . The subsets of {0, 1} m will be written in boldface: U, Y, Z.
Algorithms
The arrow ← will denote the following operations which can be distinguished by the context:
• assignment of a value to a variable, for examples:
• random assignment to a variable according to the uniform distribution, for examples:
(we draw at random a binary vector according to the uniform distribution),
(we draw at random a binary vector according to the uniform distribution on the subset U of {0,
(we draw a bit at random); • weighted random assignment to a variable according to a probability δ, for example:
(we draw at random according to the probability δ a function in a finite family ).
The other notations introduced in writing algorithms or random experiments are classical and should be easily understood.
Assumptions about probabilistic algorithms and random draws
Specify briefly the notion of probabilistic algorithm or probabilistic Turing machine, which is used throughout this article. A probabilistic Turing machine can be seen as a nondeterministic Turing machine such that for each pair (q, a), where q is a state and a a symbol, for which the transition function is defined, the finite set of available transitions has a probability distribution. These distributions must be relatively independent. In the sequel, the probabilistic algorithms have a finite maximum running time and output one bit. Then for such an algorithm A and for any input i we can define a suitable probability P A,i on the finite set of all possible execution paths on the input i. Specifically, the probability of an execution path is the product of the probabilities of transitions occurring in the path. Denote by T the set of execution paths giving the output 1 and set μ A (i) = P A,i (T) which represents the probability to obtain the output 1 when the input is i.
Random experiments defined in the paper satisfy the following assumptions: when two or more random objects are introduced simultaneously, they are assumed to have independent distribution probabilities. Moreover, when a probabilistic algorithm A is associated with any algorithm accepting random inputs, the law of the internal process of A must be assumed independent of the laws of the external random inputs. Generally the function f is built using a recursive computation, which outputs successively the bits x i of f (X 0 ). A typical case is given by a function u from {0, 1} k into itself which computes recursively a secret internal state X n from the initial value X 0 :
and a function v which from the input X n outputs the bit x n (or sometimes a few bits):
So, we can compute the successive bits of f (X 0 ) = (x 1 , · · · , x l ). If the functions u and v are well designed, an attacker knowing the first bits x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x t (but not the seed X 0 nor the successive internal states X n ) cannot compute in practice the bit x t+1 .
Example 2.2 (Blum Blum Shub generator x
2 mod n) Let n be a Blum integer (namely a product of two primes p and q which are equal to 3 modulo 4) and having k bits (classically k = 2,048). From a seed having 128 bits (here U = {0, 1} 128 ) we define the sequence X i = X 2 i−1 mod n, and then x i = lsb(X i ) = X i mod 2, where lsb(X i ) is the least significant bit of X i .
Probabilities related to a pseudo-random generator
Let U be a subset of {0, 1} k and let f : U → {0, 1} l be a pseudo-random generator. Denote by P U the uniform probability on U and let j be the uniform probability on {0, 1} j . Now we introduce the image probability
and fix an integer s such that 0 ≤ s ≤ l. We draw at random an element from {0, 1} l as follows:
(1) draw at random X 0 from U according to the uniform distribution on U;
complete the string Y s by right concatenation with a random string (y s+1 , · · · ,
We introduce a probability adapted to this construction, namely the probability to
For any integer s such that 0 ≤ s ≤ l we define over {0, 1} l the following probability p f,s by
It follows from the definitions of P U , j and Q f that:
To simplify let us denote by Y the event
by Y s the event "the s first components are y 1 · · · y s ", namely
and by Z s+1 the event "the component of index s + 1 is y s+1 ", namely
The formula (1), can be written
From the definition of conditional probability, the equality
and then using formula (1) (or formula (2)):
namely:
Remark 2.3 For s = 0 we obtain p f,0 = l (all the bits are drawn according to the uniform distribution). For s = l we obtain p f,l = Q f (all the bits are computed with the pseudo-random generator).
3 The security of a pseudo-random generator
Definition of a secure pseudo-random generator
Let us consider the following pseudo-random generator:
If A is a probabilistic algorithm having a finite maximum running time which outputs one bit, denote by μ A (e) the probability of the output 1 when the input of A is e (cf. Section 1.2).
The following random experiment, related to the construction (C f,s ) defined in Section 2.2, involves such a probabilistic algorithm A having for input a vector Y ∈ {0, 1} l and which outputs one bit. Roughly speaking, this algorithm tries to distinguish the given pseudo-random generator f from a truly random one. More precisely, it has for aim to recognize if a sequence Y is the output of the pseudo-random generator f or of a truly random generator.
Let us fix an integer s such that 0 ≤ s ≤ l.
Let q f,s be the probability that the experiment
Expt dist f,s (A)
returns b = 1. With the previous notations the following formula holds:
In particular, q f,0 is the probability of the following event: we draw at random an element of {0, 1} l according to the uniform distribution, we run the algorithm A on this element, and the output is 1. The probability q f,l is the probability of the following event: we draw at random a seed X 0 in U, we apply f to obtain an element of {0, 1} l which becomes the input of the algorithm A, and the output is 1. Let us recall now the notion of advantage which permits to quantify the ability of A to distinguish f .
Definition 3.1 The advantage of the algorithm
where q f,s is defined by formula (5).
Then we define a (T, )-distinguisher:
Definition 3.2 Let f be a pseudo-random generator. Let T and be positive real numbers. A (T, )-distinguisher for f is a probabilistic algorithm A such that (1) the maximum running time of A is ≤ T, (2) the input of A is an element of {0, 1} l , (3) the output of A is a bit b , (4) the algorithm A can distinguish the pseudo-random generator from the uniform distribution, namely
We can now define the (T, )-security of f . 
Remark 3.4
In the advantage definition we can suppose that q f,l ≥ q f,0 , if not we can replace A by the complementary algorithm (which outputs 1 when the other outputs 0 and vice versa). Using this remark we can avoid to use absolute value.
Unpredictable pseudo-random generator
then return 1 else return 0 fi End.
Let r f,s be the probability that the experiment Expt We can now define the notion of (T, s, )-prediction algorithm.
Definition 3.6
Let f be a pseudo-random generator. Let T and be positive real numbers and s be an integer such that
for f is a probabilistic algorithm such that:
(1) the maximum running time of B is ≤ T, (2) the input of B is an element of {0, 1} s , (3) the output of B is a bit, (4) Algorithm B predicts the next bit with advantage greater than , i.e. 
Remark 3.8
In the definition of advantage we can suppose that r f,s ≥ 1/2, if not we can replace B by the complementary algorithm (which outputs 1 when the other outputs 0 and vice versa). Using this remark we can avoid to use absolute value.
Yao's theorem, static version
The Yao's theorem connects the notion of security to the notion of unpredictability of the next bit. We express it in its non-asymptotic form. In this case, we give two results which can be considered respectively as a necessary condition and a sufficient condition to have the security of a generator f .
Theorem 3.9 Let
f : U ⊂ {0, 1} k → {0, 1} l .
If for some value of s (1 ≤ s < l) we have a (T, s, )-prediction algorithm for f , then there exists a (T + c, )-distinguisher where c is the constant time needed to compare two bits. Proof Let B be a (T, s, )-prediction algorithm. We build a (T, )-distinguisher A in the following way:
the return 1 else return 0 fi End.
The probability to have
l , the probability to have
is 1/2. Moreover, to obtain the running time of the built distinguisher we just add to the running time of B the constant time c needed to compare b to x s+1 (to compare two bits). 
Theorem 3.10 Let f be a pseudo-random generator:
If we have a (T, )-distinguisher
Then, there is an integer s such that |q f,s+1 − q f,s | > /l. Now, let us define the following algorithm B:
The running time of this algorithm is less than T + c 1 l + c 2 , where c 1 is the constant time needed to draw at random one bit, and c 2 the constant time needed to return z s+1 or 1 − z s+1 according to b . First we prove that the algorithm B is a (T 1 + c 1 l + c 2 , s, /l) -prediction algorithm. First, let us compute the probability r f,s such that the result of the experiment Expt We obtain the following experiment:
which only knows these components)
This experiment gives us a way to compute the probability r f,s . We remark that the result of the experiment is 1 when b = x s+1 , namely in the two following cases: Then, Q f (Z s+1 |Y s ) is the conditional probability, when Y is built from a random seed using the pseudo-random generator, that the component s + 1 of Y (namely x s+1 ) is z s+1 , assuming that the s first components are (x 1 , · · · , x s ).
Hence:
Using the formula (3) we get:
This equality and the use of the formula (5) give the following:
Remark 3.11 Changing the direction of the prediction algorithm. In Section 3.2 we defined and used right prediction algorithms, namely, given the bits (x 1 , · · · , x s ) the prediction algorithm computes the bit x s+1 (prediction of the next bit). In fact the same study, with the same results, can be done for left prediction algorithms, namely, for an algorithm which, given the bits (x s+1 , · · · , x l ), computes the bit x s (prediction of the previous bit). In particular all versions of Yao's theorem remain valid for left prediction algorithms.
Remark 3.12
Let f : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} l be a pseudo-random generator and s be an integer such that 1 ≤ s < l − 1. In many practical examples we can say that if s is an integer such that s ≤ s < l then for all algorithm B (related to s), there is an algorithm B related to s ) such that
For example let us consider the typical construction given in Section 2.1. Let u be a bijective function from {0, 1} k onto itself. The function u computes recursively a secret internal state X n from the initial value X 0 :
Now let v be a function that maps X n to a bit x n , then
Suppose that s = s + 1 < l and that we know the bits (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x s ) of f (X 0 ). Then to compute the bit of index s + 1, we can forget the bit x 1 and use an algorithm which knowing s bits, try to find the bit of index s + 1. More precisely, let X 0 = u(X 0 ) = X 1 . Starting from the seed X 0 we can compute the s first terms of the pseudo-random sequence:
As u is bijective, the probability distribution of X 0 is the same as the probability distribution of X 0 . Then there exists an algorithm B such that 
The security of a family of pseudo-random generators with same given size
We have considered the case of one pseudo-random generator f . But even in the non-asymptotic case where k and l are fixed, we have to study not only one, but a family (a finite family because k and l are fixed) of function f defined on a subset U f (which can depend on f ) of {0, 1} k with images in {0, 1} l . It is the case for the Blum Blum Shub algorithms: given the size of the modulus, we can consider all the possible moduli N having this size. Then we study algorithms which attack all the generators of the family.
4.1 Revisiting the previous notions in the case of a family of pseudo-random generators with same size
In a realistic situation we must, in the random experiment which defines the attacker's advantage, draw at random the function f from the family according to a probability law δ. So, we replace now the algorithms A and B of the previous section by algorithms whose inputs are a function f ∈ and a vector. The random experiments Expt The probability r s that the result of this experiment is 1 is
All the definitions of the advantages of the previous paragraph can be extended to this case, and the static versions of the Yao theorem can be generalized. More precisely we can modify the Definitions 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 in the following way: Definition 4.1 Let A be an algorithm having for inputs a pseudo-random generator f ∈ and a vector Y ∈ {0, 1} l and for output a bit b . The advantage of the algorithm A to distinguish an element of the family is: (1) the maximum running time of A is ≤ T, (2) the inputs of A are an element f ∈ and an element Y ∈ {0, 1} l , (3) the output of A is a bit b , (4) the algorithm A can distinguish the pseudo-random generator in from the uniform distribution, namely (1) the maximum running time of B is ≤ T, (2) the inputs of B are an element f ∈ and an element Z ∈ {0, 1} s , (3) the output of B is a bit, (4) the algorithm B can predict the next bit, namely 
The probability to have
is 1/2. Moreover, to obtain the running time of the built distinguisher we just add to the running time of B, the constant time c needed to compare b to x s+1 (to compare two bits).
Theorem 4.8 Let be a family of pseudo-random generators having the same size where each f ∈ is a function
f : U f ⊂ {0, 1} k → {0, 1} l .
If we have a (T, )-distinguisher algorithm
for we can build a We can conclude as in the proof of Theorem 3.10.
Asymptotic behavior
As a consequence of the previous results for fixed k and l, we can deduce results on the asymptotic theory of the pseudo-random generators, namely k growing to infinity and l = l(k) > k a polynomial function of k (cf. [2, Chapter 3] ). Let k be a positive integer (the security parameter) and l(k) a polynomial function of k such that l(k) > k. For any k we have a set k of deterministic functions such that (1) if f ∈ k then f is a function from a subset U f of {0, 1} k into {0, 1} l(k) ; (2) there exists a polynomial function t(k) such that for any k, any f ∈ k and any X ∈ U f the computation time of f (X) is upper-bounded by t(k); (3) for any k we provide a probability δ k on the set k .
The asymptotic notions of indistinguishability and unpredictability are derived respectively from the Definitions 4.3 and 4.6. We define now a distinguisher A to be a probabilistic polynomial algorithm having for inputs the security parameter k, a function f ∈ k and a vector Y ∈ {0, 1} l(k) , and which outputs a bit. Let k be an integer, we will denote by A k the probabilistic algorithm obtained from A by fixing the first entry to the value k. So we obtain a contradiction.
